Thursday, 26 June 2008

Mud Slinging

So other commitments have kept me from writing this until now, but I just couldn't let it pass without comment. Last week Nicholas Sarkozy blamed Peter Mandelson for the Irish referendum 'no' vote, claiming that his commitment to reducing the EU's farming subsidies had alienated Ireland's farmers. Being Nicholas Sarkozy, of course he didn't let it rest there: he went on to have go at Mr Mandelson's commissionership in general. Apart form the possibility that Sarkozy is 'just a bit mental', what conclusions can we draw from this little outburst?

Firstly we must put Sarkozy's comments into context: France is about to take over the rotating presidency of the EU, which under the current system won't happen for another 13 years. France takes over at a time when the EU is having a wobble because of the Irish 'no' vote, and Sarkozy is probably under pressure to 'just get on with it' from his great Euro-ally and architect of the Lisbon Treaty, Agela Merkel. Meanwhile poor old Nicholas isn't quite as popular at home as he once was, so he needs something to boost his flagging poll ratings and get everyone all exited about whatever Lisbon v2.0 drivel him and Angie are going to try and drive through over the next six months.

If Mandelson's anti-subsidy stance really did upset the Irish farmers, imagine what it did to the French farmers, who are a bunch well known for expressing their displeasure at any given opportunity by blockading the nearest transport hub and burning tyres (which can't be doing much for the environment, let alone the respiratory health of the French farming community). So Sarko L'American is playing to the gallery, and what better to play than a classic bit of Brit-bashing? Mandelson therefore, is the ideal target for M. Sarkozy: he is virulently anti-protectionist and British. When the people of France turn round in a few months time and say 'hang on, this Treaty of Lille (or wherever) is exactly the same as the Lisbon Treaty, but with another name' he can smile that slightly unnerving smile and say 'but of course, there was nothing wrong with that treaty, and we'd have got away with it if it wasn't for that pesky Brit.'

I am being a little facetious of course (only a little though), but this ludicrous situation does highlight a few of the problems with the way in which the EU functions. It is beholden to the presidencies of each member state in turn for six months, and each member state has an agenda that may not necessarily be anything to do with the EU itself. Obviously the issue of farming subsidies has everything to do with the EU, but Sarkozy's take on it has an entirely French viewpoint, if it happens to coincide with the viewpoints of other member states, then that is a happy coincidence. Politicians will tend first to their constituency, and rightly so. Sarkozy's constituency is France and Mandelson's is Europe, yet you have a bizarre situation where Sarkozy as president of France is effectively in charge of an organisation for which he is in no way democratically accountable except to a small portion of its constituents. Obviously the counter argument is that Mandelson is accountable to no one, and therefore not a good democratic counterbalance, and I would agree with this. Strictly speaking, Peter Mandelson is accountable to no one but his peers, but he clearly thinks of his job in terms what he can do for Europe if not the world (he does after all have a bit of a Blair complex). This in stark contrast to Sarkozy, who will only ever see his job in terms of what he can do for the people of France, and rightly so: it is his job after all.

So I am not really saying that, in terms of their roles within the EU, one is better than the other; I am saying that each is problematic for entirely different reasons and neither serve a democratic Europe sufficiently. Surely it is these aspects of the constitutional failings of the EU that we should be addressing in these treaties, then maybe we could have an EU that the people of Europe want, rather than one that some of the people in France, Germany, the Czech Republic or whoever wins the 'presidency lottery' want.

Thursday, 19 June 2008

Irish Eyes Don't Have It

There are several sayings based around the idea of not biting the hand that feeds you, and I can bet most of them have been wheeled out in reference to the Republic of Ireland at some point in the last few days. Certainly someone in Brussels will be viewing that particular country as a parent views their ungrateful teenage offspring, wondering that they can be so ungrateful after everything that has been done for them whilst they were growing up. Indeed, Ireland's response could easily be seen as teenage, partly for the determination to resist something because it is perceived to be against one or other of your deeply cherished principles, without ever actually finding out whether it is or not, but also for the perception that the world is against you, that you should 'stick it to the man' whatever the consequences.

Extending the metaphor as far is it will go, there are many in Brussels who will want to take the parental line with Ireland, and gently reprimand it, or smile condescendingly before carrying straight on, knowing what is best for the silly thing. Unfortunately, Ireland is more than a teenager, it is a nation-state with a constitutional requirement to have a referendum on external treaties. Everyone knows the facts: Ireland is the only country to vote on the Lisbon treaty, and it voted 'no', and had it not been the only country to hold a referendum, it would most likely not have been the only country to vote against the Lisbon treaty.

How can we be so certain that this is the case? Well, simply by looking at what happened in Ireland. Many people voted against the Lisbon treaty because they 'didn't understand it', which is a poor argument, considering that I would imagine that most people don't understand half of the legislation that is passed in their name, but do not take issue with this fact when it comes time to vote for the people who passed it. Many would argue that this is exactly why we shouldn't have referendums about such things, as we vote for politicians so that they can interpret complex legislation and decide upon it on our behalf. However, the job of those same politicians is to explain such complex legislation in language that we can understand, whether in order for us to vote for them with understanding, or, in the case of a referendum, to vote for it with understanding. This, clearly, the political establishment in Ireland who were backing the 'yes' vote failed to do spectacularly. But is it entirely their fault? Did people really vote 'no' because they didn't understand Lisbon, or because they didn't trust it?

Is there a sense that saying 'I don't trust it' sounds just a little bit simple or small minded, because saying it in reference to something European is just a bit too close to saying 'I don't trust those foreigners'? If this is the case, then it could be seen as a very small semantic victory for the EU: that people are no longer willing to talk openly of mistrust. Unfortunately the lack of vocalisation does not get rid of the sentiment: just because people no longer say they don't trust Europe, doesn't mean their mistrust is gone. The perception remains of some malignant old boys club hell-bent on power at any cost, and once again the Commission and their chums are doing little to dispel it. If they do force the Lisbon treaty through regardless of Ireland's decision, they will lose any vestige of the legitimacy that they should crave in the eyes of the people of Europe. There will be a genuine possibility of electorates turning against any pro-European stance, and the genuine possibility of some countries seceding from the EU. Better that they should take the chance once more to make one last breast of constitutional reform that will be acceptable to the people, that national politicians would be happy to take to their electorate in a referendum.

Impossible? Quite possibly.

Another reason why Ireland voted 'no' was because of fears over what influence the Lisbon treaty might have over their unique approach to human rights, or that it might introduce conscription into some kind of European super-army. These fears were unfounded, but once they were voiced, they stuck to the Lisbon treaty like glue. Anyone could dream up anything they liked about the treaty, and some of it would almost certainly remain in the head of one voter or another. The EU has such a bad image that people will believe anything about it, after all, this is the organisation that tried to enforce straight bananas and ban certain flavors of crisp, isn't it? With open scaremongering from those who opposed it, the Lisbon treaty would have struggled to gain a yes vote anywhere there had been a referendum. It probably would have struggled in Luxembourg as soon as someone spread the rumour that it contained a clause to move all of Europe's administrative functions to Brussels.

So it's unintelligible (well boring anyway), unattractive and prone to wild speculation, but it's just constitutional legislation, the kind of stuff that drifts through our national parliaments year in year out, without anyone batting an eyelid. Why do people people get so worked up about it? Is it genuinely as bad as its detractors say? Would it not matter what it said or did, would people hate it just because? There are at least two factors that come into play: firstly that the scale of the changes required by the Lisbon treaty is much larger than the tinkering adjustments most constitutional legislation enact these days, and secondly the popular press (and therefore a vast swathe of the public) decided long ago that Europe in general was a bad idea, much as they did recently with Gordon Brown. This means that anything associated with either subject can now be treated with the minimum amount of analysis required to pass for journalistic integrity as the undercurrent of implied derision has been established and remains throughout; the unspoken phrase 'you know you can't trust them' drifts continually just beneath the surface.

This is unfortunate for Gordon Brown, it means that unless he produces an economic miracle, invents a cure for cancer or secures Rupert Murdoch's backing before the next election, he will lose his current job. It is unfortunate, but it is by no means a tragedy: Gordon Brown is just one man, he will be replaced and will spend the rest of his life as a bitter but highly effective thorn in the side of any future government. Personally I'd really like it if he went and sorted out the Middle East, not just because it requires a sober politician, but because it would put Tony Blair's nose out of joint and prove to him once and for all that there is more to politics than ego and empty gesture. Anyway, I digress. The point is that Gordon Brown is a person, he will be replaced by someone who will get a fresh start with the press; the EU is in institution, it will not be replaced, it will not get a fresh start, it will not get another chance with the press, and so the entrenched opinion of it will remain, unless it can be replaced. If a new constitution could be formed so radically divorced from the current EU, it could perhaps be seen as a complete change. I can't see it happening during the French Presidency somehow, and I don't mean that as a slur on the French, I just think it is the sort of thing that would take a little longer than six months to sort out.

Of course a lot of my understanding of perception of the EU is very UK-centric, and this is no good at all. Through recent discussions, I have come to the conclusion that (again in the UK at least) a big problem with our approach to the EU is that it is from an entirely national standpoint, so I must find a way of finding out more conclusively what the prevailing opinions are around Europe, so that I can better understand what could work and what people would want or accept. If anyone has ideas, please let me know.